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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS-A PRESENT NEED
FRED HERZOG
T HE CASE of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co.'
decided by the Court of Appeals of New York within the last
year sheds an interesting light upon the tendency recently ex-
hibited by several courts to restrict arbitration proceedings and to
exercise extensive judicial control over them. The facts of the River-
dale case are rather simple. Two parties entered into a contract for the
sale of yarn; the sales memorandum contained the following printed
sentence: "This contract is also subject to the Cotton Yarn Rules of
1938 as amended." ' The rules referred to were regulatory measures
adopted by certain well-known trade associations of cotton yarn deal-
ers in the United States. One of these rules contained an elaborate ex-
clusive arbitration clause. When a dispute arose between the parties,
one of them proposed to institute arbitration proceedings; the other,
thereupon, commenced proceedings to stay the arbitration of the con-
troversy in accordance with the applicable provisions of the New
York Arbitration Statute.3 The lower court denied the stay, but the
Appellate Division reversed the ruling and granted the application of
the stay,4 yet after reargument affirmed the lower court's decision by
a divided court;5 in doing so, it relied upon the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals in Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co.6
'306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E. 2d 104 (1954) (three judges dissenting, two of them,
Desmond and Froessel, writing separate dissenting opinions).
2 Ibid., at 289 and 105.
3 New York Civil Practice Act (Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939) §§ 1448-
1469.
4281 App. Div. 831, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (2d Dep't, 1953).
5 281 App. Div. 983, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 261 (2d Dep't, 1953).
6 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E. 2d 218 (1953).
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which had been rendered in the meantime. The Court of Appeals re-
versed the Appelate Division and granted, by a divided court, the mo-
tion to stay the arbitration proceedings.
The majority based its decision upon the principle that a person will
be compelled to surrender his right to resort to the courts only, if he
has done so in writing by clear and unmistakable language. The clause
in the sales memorandum making the contract subject to the Cotton
Yarn Rules, which in turn contained an arbitration clause, was in the
majority's opinion not sufficiently definite to demonstrate the parties'
agreement to have controversies arising out of the sales contract settled
by the process of arbitration. The majority pointed in this respect to
the decision of the New York Appellate Division in the case of In re
General Silk Importing Co. 7 in which the sales memoranda stated that
"sales are governed by raw silk rules adopted by the Silk Association
of America." There, too, the rules referred to contained an exclusive
arbitration provision, but it was held that the language employed
demonstrated merely the intention of the parties to insure the per-
fornance of the contract in compliance with the adduced rules but
did not evidence an agreement to have controversies arbitrated in ac-
cordance therewith, although both parties were members of the asso-
ciation which had promulgated the rules in question. The majority at-
tempted to distinguish the case at hand from the recent decision ren-
dered by the Court of Appeals in Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken
& Co.' relied upon by the Appellate Division in which the parties were
held to have agreed upon arbitration upon the basis of the following
clause contained in the sales memoranda: "This Salesnote is subject to
the provisions of Standard Cotton Textile Salesnote which, by this
reference, is incorporated as a part of this agreement and together
herewith constitutes the entire contract between buyer and seller."
There, the majority declared, the standard cotton textile salesnote
which contained the arbitration clause was incorporated verbatim in
the sales contract and thereby integrated and made part of the sales
contract-a fact which was not present in the instant case.9
7 198 App. Div. 16, 189 N.Y. Supp. 391 (1st Dep't, 1921), on renewal 200 App. Div.
786, 194 N.Y. Supp. 15 (1st Dep't, 1922), aff'd 234 N.Y. 513, 138 N.E. 427 (1922).
8 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E. 2d 218 (1953).
9 Compare with the Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288,
118 N.E. 2d 104 (1954), and Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co. 305 N.Y.
82, 111 N.E. 2d 218 (1953) cases, the recent case of Madawick Contracting Co. v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E. 2d 520 (1954), in which the New
York Court of Appeals held that an insurance company which insured a subcontractor
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The dissenting judges-seemingly correctly-emphasized that there
was really no difference in law between provisions which read that
"sales are governed by raw silk rules . . ." or are "subject to the Cot-
ton Yarn Rules.. ." or "subject to the provisions of Standard Cotton
Textile Salesnote which, by this reference, is incorporated as part of
this agreement... ." None of the contracts that served as a basis for the
comparison which the majority made, contained an actual mention of
the arbitration clause and all of them were made subject to outside
rules which, on inspection, would have revealed the existence of an
arbitration clause. Thus-the dissenting judges claimed-the legal sig-
nificance was the same, although the phraseology varied; the result,
therefore, should be the same too, in all the cases which were con-
sidered.
The restatement of the opinions of the majority and minority judges
in a rather detailed manner serves as a good prelude to the problem to
be considered in this article. If these opinions are carefully analyzed, it
would appear that the view expressed by the dissenting judges is
sounder than that stated by the majority which seemingly sacrifices
substance to form and favors in such contracts, as were involved in the
proceedings, verbosity over simplicity of expression. One has the
feeling that a certain cult with magic words is practiced, reminiscent
of the early days of the common law when the failure to use certain
prescribed words was fatal to the effectiveness of the transaction or
document.
Yet, there is a deep significance in the majority's opinion; this signif-
icance is not so much to be found in the reasoning as such but rather
in the causes which have moved an outstanding court to engage in such
hairsplitting nuances and to view commercial contracts and transac-
tions with a formalistic rigor and harshness, hardly to be expected in
the interpretation of commercial agreements. It, therefore, becomes
important to analyze the frame of mind-the judicial mood, as it may
be called-of the judges which has given rise to such opinions and dis-
tinguishes between fine shades and subtleties of language basing
thereon diametrically opposed legal rulings. This frame of mind be-
against his contractual liability towards the general contractor would be bound by
an arbitration award fixing the subcontractor's liability, although the insurance con-
tract merely referred to the agreement between the subcontractor and general con-
tractor. The court felt that the company's agent's reading of the subcontract, which
contained the arbitration clause, was sufficient to inform the company of the existence
of the arbitration clause and to establish the Company's eventual liability based upon
an arbitration award.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
trays the growing mistrust and apprehension with which judges have
viewed arbitration proceedings-mistrust and apprehension which have
manifested themselves in various forms and ways.
Broadened scope of judicial review of arbitrators' awards for the
purpose of finding out whether the award was in contravention of
established legal principles, determination by the courts whether an
arbitrable issue was present and limitation of arbitration proceedings
to those cases where parties have clearly and unequivocally agreed to
submit their controversies to arbitration and have rigidly complied
with the arbitration agreement-these are the most common instances
of the ways and devices utilized by the courts in which their mistrust
of arbitration proceedings finds expression. Although this phenom-
enon is not confined to one state or one part of the country, it is partic-
ularly noticeable in New York, and, therefore, eminently character-
istic; for it is generally recognized that New York is an arbitration-
conscious state, favoring arbitration, and the New York arbitration
statute10 has been generally considered a model arbitration statute"
which provides for a very limited scope of review of arbitrators'
awards and in this respect is declaratory of the common law. Thus the
situation in New York serves as a good indicator and barometer of
trend and outlook in the country.
AWARDS CONTRAVENING ESTABLISHED
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
As mentioned previously, recent decisions have manifested a strong
tendency on the part of the courts to interfere in arbitration proceed-
ings and to broaden the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards.'
Up till that time it was generally accepted with a few dissenting voices,
that unless the submission agreement specifically required the arbi-
trator to decide the case in accordance with existing law, he could
determine questions of law and fact as he saw fit and that a court had
10 New York Civil Practice Act (Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939) §§ 1448-69.
11 See Judicial Innovations in the New York Arbitration Law, 21 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
148, 149 (1953).
12Judicial control of the arbitration process has caused several comments in recent
years, mostly critical of such "judicial interference." See, for example, Mayer, Judicial
"Bulls" in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, Labor Law Journal 502
(July 1951); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 1
(1953); and Rosenfarb, The Courts and Arbitration, New York University Sixth
Annual Conference on Labor, 161 (1953).
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no authority to disturb such determinations.'" The award constituted
a full and final adjustment of the controversy and mistakes of law and
erroneous legal or factual findings of the arbitrator did not give the
courts the power to vacate the award.' 4 The parties had selected their
own tribunal and had chosen their own umpire; thus, they had submit-
ted their controversy to the individual judgment of the arbitrator-ajudgment which would not have to be fettered by the shackles of logic
or law but was merely supposed to represent the best judgment and
the honest opinion of the arbitrator. 5 If the arbitrator rendered an in-
correct judgment, a court should not annul the award because it
thought it might have rendered a better one.' "A contrary course
would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of
the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the com-
mencement, not the end, of litigation.' 17
Despite these repeated pronouncements on the part of various courts
disclaiming any right to interfere in arbitration proceedings or to
review even erroneous awards of arbitrators, courts in recent years
have not shied away from doing so if they felt that arbitration was
unwarranted, unjustified or undesirable or that an award rendered by
an arbitrator was contrary to established legal principles. A few exam-
ples will illustrate this tendency exhibited by the courts, although even
recent cases abound in statements in which lip service is given to the
old declarations of principle and the courts' restrained power of
review. 8
The devices of interference utilized by the courts may take on dif-
ferent forms, depending upon the statute under which the particular
court operates. In the State of New York where the tendency to inter-
fere with arbitration proceedings is most noticeable-not because of a
peculiar hostility against arbitration evinced by the New York judges
13 See, for instance, Liggett v. Torrington Bid. Co., 114 Conn. 425, 158 Atd. 917
(1932); White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 Ill. 578, 77 N.E. 327 (1906).
14 6 Williston, Contracts § 1929A (rev. ed., 1938).
15 White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 II. 578, 77 N.E. 327 (1906).
16 Burchell v. Marsh, 54 U.S. 344, 349 (1855).
17 Ibid. See also, for example, Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y.
392, 400 (1875): "If courts should assume to rejudge the decision of arbitrators upon
the merits, the value of this method of settling controversies would be destroyed, and
an award instead of being a final determination of a controversy would become but
one of the steps in its progress."
18 See, for instance, Sampson Motors, Inc., v. Roland, 121 Cal. 2d 491, 263 P. 2d
445 (1953); and Allen v. Jayne, 279 App. Div. 444, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 609 (1st Dep't, 1952).
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but because of the sheer number of arbitration proceedings which the
New York Statute 9 encourages-the courts either have used their
power to stay arbitration proceedings to accomplish their aim or have
simply broadened their scope of review. ° This is particularly signif-
icant, since the right to stay or to compel arbitration proceedings and
to vacate or modify arbitration awards is rather limited under the New
York statute. Thus, a court may stay or compel arbitration only upon
determination of substantial issues pertaining "to the making of the
contract or submission or the failure to comply therewith."' 21 As far as
the review of an arbitrator's award is concerned, it may be vacated, in
general, only when the arbitrator was guilty of evident partiality, mis-
conduct or corruption, or exceeded his powers or rendered an award
which was not definite and final. 22 The courts may modify an award
where there was a miscalculation of figures or a misdescription of a
person or property referred to in the award or "where the award is
imperfect in a matter of form" or was made on a matter not submitted
but not affecting the merits of the decision.3
Despite these limited powers with which the arbitration statute in-
vested the courts, the judges have ingeniously found ways and means
within the narrow confines of the law to exercise proper control over
arbitration proceedings. Thus, in the case of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v.
Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 4 discussed previously, they have insisted that
submission of a matter to arbitration will be enforced only if the
parties have made a clear and unequivocal agreement to that effect.25
This has almost led to the requirement that the settling of a dispute by
the method of arbitration must be spelled out expressis verbis in the
contract in order to give it effectiveness. Closely connected therewith
is the requirement insisted upon by the courts that arbitration will be
permitted only if the issue is an arbitrable one; this issue will be
determined by the court and not by the arbitrator,26 which means that
19 New York Civil Practice Act (Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939) S§ 1448-69.
20 See Judicial Innovations in the New York Arbitration Law, 21 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
148 (1953).
21 New York Civil Practice Act (Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939) § 1450.
22 Ibid. § 1462.
23 Ibid. § 1462a.
24 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E. 2d 104 (1954).
25 See also Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N.Y. 130, 190 N.E. 208 (1934).
26 Application of Graphite Metallizing Corporation, 271 App. Div. 839, 66 N.Y.S.
2d 53 (2d Dep't, 1946).
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it is the court who decides whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction and
not the arbitrator himself. In Towns & James v. Barasch,27 for in-
stance, a collective bargaining agreement provided that if any claim,
dispute or controversy should arise between the parties concerning
any condition, provision or term contained in any article of the agree-
ment, which could not be adjusted by negotiation, the matter should
be submitted to arbitration. The agreement also contained a clause
stating that either party could upon notice during the term of the
agreement request the other party to negotiate for a revision of the
employees' wages or working hours. The union in accordance with
the agreement requested a revision of the wages; negotiations ensued
which ended in a deadlock. The union thereupon demanded arbitra-
tion, but the court upon petition of the employer stayed the arbitra-
tion proceedings, simply stating that the arbitration clause was not
explicit enough to cover the wage revision controversy. It might be
argued2" that the court, in interpreting the arbitration clause and
thereby the contract, transgressed upon the territory reserved exclu-
sively to the arbitrator by legislative mandate. But it may be asked in
this connection: Is it not wise for the courts to exercise such powers
which will check carefully upon the assumption of jurisdiction on the
part of arbitrators? Is not the unbridled exercise of jurisdiction and
thereby of power fraught with great danger to the body politic which,
therefore, should be a point of grave concern to the courts? Have not
the courts the ultimate right to investigate and to determine the juris-
diction of all other agencies or persons exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions and is it not desirable, nay imperative, that one
authority only-the courts-exercise this control which is vested in
them by the constitutional scheme of division of powers?
While it might be contended that in Towns & James v. Barasch,20
the court interpreted mainly the arbitration clause, in order to decide
the arbitrability of the dispute, the courts clearly engaged in the inter-
pretation of the substantive provisions of the contract in International
Ass'n. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer° to effectuate the same pur-
pose. In that case a collective bargaining agreement provided that the
27 197 Misc. 1022, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 32 (S. Ct., 1950).
28 See Rosenfarb, The Courts and Arbitration, N.Y.U. Sixth Annual Conference
on Labor 161 (1953).
29 197 N.Y. Misc. 1022, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 32 (S. Ct., 1950).
80 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1st Dep't, 1947), aff'd without opinion (two
judges dissenting) 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. 2d 464 (1947).
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employer would meet with the union "to discuss payment of a
bonus."'3 ' The agreement also provided for arbitration of disputes con-
cerning the" '... meaning, performance, non-performance or applica-
tion' of its provisions. ' 32 The parties met and discussed the bonus but
were unable to reach an agreement. The union moved for arbitration
but the court held that the dispute was not arbitrable. It took the view
that the agreement required the employer to "discuss" the bonus but
not to pay it. In doing so, the court made the following characteristic
statement:
While the contract provides for arbitration of disputes as to the "meaning,
performance, non-performance or application" of its provisions, the mere as-
sertion by a party of a meaning of a provision which is clearly contrary to the
plain meaning of the words, cannot make an arbitrable issue. It is for the court
to determine whether the contract contains a provision for arbitration of the
dispute tendered, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction the court must de-
termine whether there is such a dispute. If the meaning of the provision of
the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be any-
thing to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration. 33
The phraseology used in the quotation just stated which acknowl-
edges the courts' power to interpret the provisions of a contract in
order to determine the existence of an arbitrable issue forms a bridge
over to the exercise of a broadened review power on the part of the
courts. For if the courts may delve into and interpret a contract for the
purpose of finding out the existence of an arbitrable controversy they
also must have the power to examine whether an arbitrator in his
award has correctly interpreted the contract, since it might appear
that by his eventual misinterpretation of the contractual provisions he
has assumed the existence of an arbitrable dispute where none was
present and has exercised powers which, in reality, he did not possess.
Thus, the foundation is laid for the assumption of a large review
power by the courts-larger than the statute seemingly intended them
to have.
The case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Comm. Ass'n 34
affords a good example of the exercise of this extended review power
by the courts. In this case, a collective bargaining agreement provided
that the union should not engage in strikes or other stoppages of work
31271 App. Div. 917, 918 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317, 318 (1st Dep't, 1947).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E. 2d 162 (1949) (4-3 decision), noted in 63 Harv. L. Rev.
347 (1949).
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during the life of the contract, and that disputes as to the application
or interpretation of the contract should be submitted to an arbitrator
who, however, should have no authority to alter or modify the provi-
sions of the agreement. A controversy arose between union and com-
pany when the union, in support of a strike called by affiliated unions
against other cablegram companies, refused to handle cablegrams
which during their transmission had been handled by any one of the
strike-bound companies. The issue submitted to arbitration was
whether the union by engaging in such refusal had breached its collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found that there was a trade
custom in existence in the industry not to handle so-called "hot traffic"
and consequently that the union's refusal to work, when read in the
light of that custom, did not amount to a breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The award was upheld by the lower court, but
vacated by the Appellate Division, 5 whose action, in turn, was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 6 In doing so, the high court de-
clared that the arbitrator had no right to resort to customs of trade in
interpreting the contract since the language was unambiguous, plain
and clear and did not admit of resort to extrinsic circumstances. The
arbitrator, therefore, had exceeded his powers.
It is quite obvious that the courts, under the claim of reviewing the
arbitrator's authority, actually determined the merits of the contro-
versy by supplying their own interpretation to the contract and by
setting aside the contrary interpretation of the arbitrator which, as the
courts claimed, amounted to an unauthorized exercise of power. It
needs not much imagination to visualize the extension of the scope of
the courts' review power when the line of reasoning in the Western
Union case is carefully considered.
Closely related to the line of cases exemplified by the Western
Union case in which the courts have broadened their review power by
scrutinizing the contractual interpretation indulged in by the arbi-
trator are those in which the courts have found that the arbitrator
has exceeded his authority by failing to use the remedy expressly
specified by the parties in their contract, but instead has devised a
remedy of his own.
Typical of this group of cases are those in which, for instance, the
arbitrator was called upon to decide whether an employee had violated
a company rule and, therefore, was properly discharged in accordance
35 274 App. Div. 754, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (1st Dep't, 1948).
86 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E. 2d 162 (1949).
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with the collective bargaining agreement which provided discharge as
punishment for such violation; in a goodly number of such instances
the arbitrator took it upon himself to mitigate the punishment meted
out to the employee by the employer and to convert the discharge into
a temporary suspension, although he had found that the employee had
actually broken the plant rule and, therefore, could be properly dis-
charged under the terms of the contract. The courts have held in such
situations that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority, since he modi-
fied the contract existing between the parties.37 One should assume that
arbitrators would recognize the limitation of their power and like the
courts abide by the terms of the contract, which means, impose the
penalty which the contract prescribes; yet, some of them have serious-
ly argued that, barring a contract expressly prohibiting the arbitrator
from modifying a penalty, they have the right to change the penalty if
they find it too severe,88 thereby substituting their judgment for that
of the employer, one of the parties to the dispute.
The courts, lastly, will interfere in arbitration proceedings and va-
cate an award, which, in their opinion, is contrary to public policy.
Since the term "public policy" is rather loose and may cover a wide
and varying territory, it can easily be seen that the courts by conjur-
ing the magic notion of public policy may assume broad review pow-
ers89 which are otherwise denied to them. Until now the cases have
been comparatively rare in which the courts have found it necessary
to vacate awards which have been contrary to public policy. But it
must be realized that this tendency for broader review and closer
check of arbitration proceedings on the part of the courts is only in its
infant stage and represents only the beginning of a move which may
gain vigor and definite contours as time progresses.
The outstanding case in which the court held that an award violated
public policy is Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Del. Union.40
37 See, for example, American Safety Razor Corp. v. Amalgamated Machine, In-
strument & Metal Local 475, 280 App. Div. 800, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (2d Dep't, 1952).
88 Platt, The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 31 J. Am.
Jud. Soc. 54 (1947).
89 The policy of the courts to formulate and to enunciate "the public policy". of
a state is of particular importance in view of the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncement that the public policy of a state may be expressed by its courts even
though the legislature has not chosen to legislate on the particular subject matter
involved. Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
40 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (1st Dep't, 1952) (3-2 decision), noted in
22 Fordham L. Rev. 202 (1953); 66 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1953); 27 St. John's L. Rev.
346 (1953); 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 157 (1952); 52 Col. L. Rev. 943 (1952); 4 Syracuse L.
Rev. 140 (1952).
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In that case the majority of the court refused to confirm an award in
which the arbitrator, in accordance with the express power granted to
him by the contract, had assessed punitive damages against a union
which had violated a no-strike clause, the main reason being that puni-
tive damages were in contravention of the public policy of the state.
The majority's opinion contains the following characteristic state-
ment:
The court will not lend its power to the enforcement of the kind of a de-
cision in arbitration which it would neither allow nor enforce as the subject of
an action maintained before it directly.4
1
Another case enunciating the same principle is Western Union Tel.
Co. v. American Comm. Ass'n,42 previously referred to. The court
stated there, among other reasons, that an award which sanctioned the
refusal of a telegraphers' union to handle messages emanating from
certain strike-bound companies was invalid since a penal law of the
State of New York43 made it a criminal offense for telegraph company
employees to wilfully refuse to transmit messages.
The decisions cited above were set forth as illustrative examples of
the various ways which the courts utilized to interfere in arbitration
proceedings. Some of these decisions might be viewed by an unbiased
examiner as ill-considered, some again as proper and in the best interest
of justice. But through all of them goes a common streak of distrust
and apprehension which the courts have exhibited toward arbitration
proceedings-distrust and apprehension that has prompted them to
step over the boundaries of review drawn by the statute and to tread
upon territory from which they are supposedly excluded.
THE NEW EQUITY OF LAWLESSNESS
In view of the apprehension with which courts have apparently be-
gun to view the arbitration process and the resulting increasing inter-
ference by the courts in that process, the question arises by necessity
whether that apprehension is justified and based upon some real, ra-
tional foundation or whether it represents merely an emotional out-
growth of frustration, brought about by a feeling of professional
jealousy which senses with growing concern the progressive inroads
made by arbitrators upon the courts' jurisdiction. It might be true that
41280 App. Div. 500, 507, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 401, 407 (Ist Dep't, 1952).
42299 N.Y. 117, 86 N.E. 2d 162 (1949).
43 New York Penal Law (Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939) § 1423 (6).
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courts are anxious and prone to protect their jurisdiction and power,
for that is only human; nobody who administers an office wants to see
his official functions diminished and infringed upon. That is probably
the psychological reason for those decisions rendered in certain juris-
dictions, which hold that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are
invalid because they would oust the courts of jurisdiction." But petty
professional jealousy is too simple an explanation for the phenomenon
of growing control of the arbitration process. If, for example, the case
of Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Del. Union45 is recalled
to mind, in which the court refused to uphold an award for puni-
tive damages since it ran counter to the public policy of the state,
it becomes apparent that there were deeper and weightier reasons
present than a feeling of jealousy which prompted the court to act.
There must have been present deep concern and growing apprehen-
sion of the judges over the pronouncements of arbitrators who not
only exercised far-reaching judicial powers but whose decisions
affected a multitude of citizens. These arbitrators disregarded well-
recognized principles of law, scoffed surreptitiously at them, pro-
claimed their independence from the public policy of the state and
substituted for the legal thoughts of the community, as formulated
and expressed by the courts, their own ideologies and ideas of justice.
They displayed the attitude of judicial demi-gods who stood above
the law of the community, were not bound by it, and, therefore, could
create and invoke their own law and determine each case before them
according to their own concepts of justice and economic philosophy.
Thus, the courts were faced with instances where arbitrators, with-
out hesitation, changed the contract entered into by the parties, or,
under the guise of interpretation, modified it,46 in spite of the age-old
principle that anyone deciding a contractual dispute between two
parties must determine it under the terms of the contract as written
and interpreted by the contracting parties and may not supply his own
interpretation.47 There were cases where arbitrators altered the con-
44 See, for instance, White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 I11. 240, 129 N.E. 753
(1921).
45 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (1st Dep't, 1952).
46 See, for instance, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, 271 App.
Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1st Dep't, 1947), aff'd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. 2d 464 (1947).
47 See, for instance, the following statement by the Illinois Supreme Court in Engle-
stein v. Mintz, 345 Ill. 48, 60, 177 N.E. 746, 751 (1931): "Courts of equity may not,
under the guise of construction make a new or different contract for the parties. Gibbs
v. People's Nat'l Bank, 198 Il. 307, 64 N.E. 1060; Clark v. Mallory, 185 Ill. 227, 56 N.E.
1099."
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tract and interfered with well-established legal principles by changing
the remedy which the parties to the contract had provided for the in-
fraction of certain provisions.4 s There were instances where arbitrators
invented new legal doctrines which contravened those of the com-
munity enunciated by the courts and where they ruled in violation of
the public policy of the state.49 Were the judges idly to sit by, particu-
larly when appealed to by the harmed party to right the wrong? Were
the judges to refuse relief to the wronged party and to acknowledge
two rules of law, one for the community at large and the other for
those whose disputes were settled by arbitration? For it should be
noted that contrary to the wails of anguish emitted by some writers
that the judges have attempted to destroy the autonomy of the arbi-
trators against the wishes of all the parties concerned,50 it is only
through the appeal to the courts by at least one of the parties affected
that the judges obtain jurisdiction and thereby the power to "meddle"
in arbitration proceedings.
If the courts had encountered only occasional slip-ups by arbitrators
in which they had turned away from the well-recognized principles of
law, the courts might have shrugged off the matter and might not have
scrutinized arbitration matters with the meticulous care which they
seem to be exercising now. But these objectionable judicial pronounce-
ments of arbitrators did not constitute isolated instances and did not
slacken; they began to form part and parcel of an ever growing body
of law which increased daily and proceeded to engulf large segments
of the law. Proof of that can be found in the fields of commercial and
labor arbitration. Thus, the adjudging of labor disputes arising under
collective bargaining agreements falls practically exclusively in the
domain of arbitrators. If the vast amount of collective bargaining
agreements in force in the United States is realized, if it is kept in
mind that these agreements cover thousands of businesses and indus-
tries throughout the country and regulate the conduct of millions of
persons and the economic conditions of numerous enterprises"' upon
48 See, for instance, American Safety Razor Corp. v. Amalgamated Machine, In-
strument & Metal Local 475, 280 App. Div. 800, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (2d Dep't, 1952).
49 See, for instance, Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Comm. Ass'n, 299 N.Y.
117, 86 N.E. 2d 162 (1949).
50 See Rosenfarb, The Courts and Arbitration, New York University Sixth Annual
Conference on Labor 161 (1953).
51 "An arbitration clause has been included in more than 91% of the 75,000 or more
collective contracts essentially in operation in this country and affecting more than
five and a half million employees." Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses
upon the Individual, 9 Arb. J. 3, 4 (n.s., 1954).
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which, in turn, the well-being of the nation depends, then the rulings
of arbitrators and the development of a new body of law distinct and
differing from that found in the courts of the country is no small mat-
ter; then these arbitration decisions cannot be ignored and dismissed
as the occasional outbursts of individuals who in their exuberance over
the-maybe once in a lifetime-acquired power to exercise judicial
prerogatives have overstepped the bounds of judicial discretion. It
might be that this emotional factor coupled with the often misunder-
stood principle that the arbitrator may proceed free from the fetters
of legal rules has produced these awards which reflect the arbitrator's
independence from current legal thought. It might also be that the
arbitrator's knowledge that, barring any fraud or corruptness on his
part, his determination of the issues is final and cannot be reviewed, has
given rise to the awards questioned by the courts. Yet, be that as it
may, the stark fact remains that the courts began to sense the emer-
gence of some new kind of legal ideology which commenced to take
definite contours, encompassing the most important areas of the coun-
try's economic life and large segments of the nation's citizens. It can
safely be assumed that the motives prompting the courts to interfere
with arbitration proceedings have been at this early stage of develop-
ment "acted on rather as inarticulate instincts than as definite ideas, for
which a rational defense is ready."52 In other words, the courts have
intuitively grasped the danger, without having had the time and with-
out having been afforded the benefit of historical perspective to formu-
late precisely the legal and logical basis for the necessity and desirabil-
ity of their interference.
This new ideology evinced in arbitration awards with its attendant
body of law, regulating the jural relations of great numbers of the
population, can best be described as some sort of folksy jurisprudence,
characterized not so much by the emergence of a new set of guiding
rules but rather by the negation of basic legal principles heretofore
commonly accepted in the community and by making expediency the
basic idea to be followed in the determination of controversies. Thus,
this new jurisprudence is based, in general, upon emotion rather than
legal principle, upon economic policy considerations rather than the
achievement of equal justice. Pity for the plight of the economically
weaker, or supposedly weaker, or the desire to preserve industrial
52 Holmes, J., in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106,
44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896).
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peace are frequently found examples in which the emotional basis or
the basis of economic policy, respectively, manifest themselves.
Compromise-the brain-child of expediency-and not to each his
due, has become the desired end, elevating it to the pedestal otherwise
occupied by equal justice. Typical of that idea of compromise are the
many instances, mentioned already previously, where a collective bar-
gaining agreement provides for the discharge of a worker in case he
violates a certain plant rule and where the arbitrator converts the dis-
charge ordered by the employer after the worker's violation of the
rule, into a temporary suspension, although he has found that the
worker has been actually guilty of an infraction of the plant rule. It
might immediately be interjected that there is nothing wrong with
such decisions and, on the contrary, that they are desirable since they
introduce merely an element of equity into the relationship involved.
Yet, such an argument loses sight of the fact that the arbitrator by
rendering such a decision has overstepped his bounds, that he has
arrogated functions which were not allotted to him by the parties and
that he thereby has entered upon territory from which he was ex-
cluded by the will of the parties. Above all, once having acted with-
out proper authority, where is that path of lawlessness going to lead?
Soon he will change, by more or less subtle interpretation, the substan-
tive terms of the contract and mold the jural relations of the parties
according to his own economic conception. Once the individual's eco-
nomic philosophy has become the determinative yardstick, injustice
will be a certain consequence.
It is this new body of lawlessness against which the courts have
taken a stand and which breeds the suspicion with which courts have
begun to view arbitration proceedings whenever called upon to do so.
The emergence of this new body of law is strongly reminiscent of
the development of equity jurisprudence in England. There, too, the
chancellors, at the outset, did not intend and did not visualize the crea-
tion of a new legal system. But with the progress of time and the con-
tinuing rigidity of the common law, granting redress only in the form
of damages and excluding specific relief, apart from actions for the
recovery of land, equity began to emerge as a new legal system. 3 The
sad spectacle of two competing and conflicting systems existing side
by side within the same state unfolded itself before the eyes of the
stunned citizens trying to find redress for the wrongs suffered by
53 Walsh, A Treatise on Equity 2-11 (1930).
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them. Had the common law judges not persisted in the denial of spe-
cific relief and had the historical constellation in England been differ-
ent, at the critical time, equity would never have developed as a dis-
tinct and separate system, 4 sparing thereby the citizenry the unneces-
sary expense and dilemma of two feuding systems.
The present day judges, unlike their brethren in the middle ages,
have instinctively reacted to this new equity of compromise and op-
portunism. They have stood up and have attempted to nip the nascent
system in the bud. Time will tell whether they succeeded.
Unlike, however, the circumstances prevailing in the middle ages,
there is nowadays no necessity for the development of a new legal
system; there is no rigidity of rules, practices and procedures prevail-
ing in the courts, and, above all, there is no inclination on the part of
the courts to interfere with the arbitration process as such. Contem-
porary courts possess the necessary mental and procedural flexibility
to deal with all problems thrown up by modem society, particularly
if it is kept in mind that the power exercised by the courts in this type
of cases is merely a review power which concerns itself not with the
application of the arbitrator's expertness to the issues at hand but
rather with the preservation and the safeguarding of basic legal princi-
ples recognized in the community at large. That the courts are perfect-
ly well capable of fulfilling this function is proven by the fact that
they have exercised and continue to exercise far-reaching review
powers over the rulings of administrative agencies carrying out quasi-
judicial functions.5 Yet, despite this review power exercised by the
courts, administrative agencies have continued to function efficiently
within their allotted field and their effectiveness has not been impaired.
At the present time nobody would seriously argue that the courts
should be severely restrained or barred from the exercise of review
powers over the judicial rulings of administrative agencies. However,
with respect to arbitration proceedings it is contended that the courts
should engage in a hands-off policy. It is argued that such conduct on
the part of the courts is regrettable, since it destroys and nullifies the
autonomy and thereby the usefulness of arbitration, because the
courts supposedly do not possess the necessary expertness to deal effec-
54 Ibid., at 7, 8.
55 See, for instance, the review power which the United States Courts of Appeal
exercise over orders of the N.L.R.B., dealing with unfair labor practices. 49 Stat. 453
(1936), 29 U.S.C.A. S 160(f) (1936).
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tively and efficiently with arbitration problems.5 But this argument
misses the point. The question is not whether the courts should take
over the settling of disputes which are peculiarly suited for arbitration
and are traditionally determined by such means, but rather whether
the courts, as guardians of the law of the land, should tolerate the
emergence of a new set of legal principles which are opposed to those
promulgated by them and which apply to certain groups of the popu-
lation a yardstick different from that by which the conduct of other
citizens is gauged. The courts have shown that they will not abdicate
their functions and will not be blocked in the exercise of these func-
tions by even narrowly drawn statutory provisions, if a literal inter-
pretation of these provisions would tend to emasculate the primary
power of the courts-to preserve and safeguard justice by seeing to it
that basic and well-recognized legal principles are observed and
applied.
It must be said in all fairness that eminent arbitrators have always
been aware of the limitations which are imposed upon them by existing
legal principles; they have recognized that they must determine dis-
putes before them within the framework of these principles and not
by disregarding them and deciding the matter according to their own
ideas of law.5 7 But unfortunately a goodly number of arbitrators have
not followed this noteworthy prescript, although they might have
given lip-service to it.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages it has been attempted to set forth the reasons
which apparently have motivated the courts to tighten the judicial
control over arbitration proceedings.
The danger of the emergence of a new legal system covering the
disputes of large groups of the population engendered the instinctive
56 Rosenfarb, The Courts and Arbitration, New York University Sixth Annual Con-
ference on Labor 161 (1953).
57 See, for example, the following statement by Prof. Clarence M. Updegraff,
chairman of the arbitration board, in Kansas City Public Service Co., 8 L.A. 149, 159
(1947): "No award of this board can give validity to any contract which contravenes
the law of any state. If it is indeed true that the Kansas law is ineffective because
unconstitutional, that result has not yet been authoritatively declared by a court of
last resort. The act must be assumed effective until otherwise determined." See also
the excellent treatment given in Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 169-85 (1952);
and Platt, The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 31 J. Am.
Jud. Soc. 54 (1947).
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reaction of the courts to prevent the growth of such a system, so that
it may eventually die of a natural death.
It is believed that this reaction on the part of the courts is desirable
and laudable, for it would be unfortunate and unwarranted to have
within the same community, after law and equity, a third system arise,
which eventually will compete and feud with the existing system or
systems. In these days of merger and simplification of procedure it
would be a luxury which would be in the last resort detrimental to all
the parties concerned. For it should be once more emphasized that this
new system, unlike equity, was not brought about by the shortcomings
of the existing and available means to right a wrong, but rather by the
refusal of some arbitrators to abide by and to apply basic legal princi-
ples recognized in the community. What the courts did was merely to
bring back to the path of law and order those who had strayed away
from it. The value of the arbitration process as a means of settling
disputes is thereby in no way impaired or diminished. On the contrary,
it is believed that parties who have heretofore been hesitant to enter
into arbitration agreements for fear that the arbitrator might settle the
controversy according to his own conception of law might now be
more amenable to having their dispute determined by arbitration, since
they might anticipate the likelihood of court interference if the award
should violate established legal principles. It would be desirable if
statutes were enacted to this effect in every state that does not already
have such a provision, which would be applicable to all arbitration
proceedings, whether instituted under the common law or under a
particular arbitration statute. The advantages of arbitration such as ex-
peditiousness, saving of costs and expertness of the arbitrator would
in no way be diminished or impaired.
